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EU AGENCIES BETWEEN MERONI AND ROMANO OR THE 
DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA
MERIJN CHAMON*
1. Introduction
The so-called agencification of the Union administration that started in the 
1990s has picked up speed ever since then,1 leading some authors to speak of 
a mushrooming of agencies in the European Union’s institutional landscape.2 
Most of these agencies have only limited powers, their tasks confined to gath-
ering and disseminating information, or coordinating a network. Using the 
instrumental approach to classification proposed by Griller and Orator,3 these 
are ordinary agencies. Although even the legality under the Treaties of the 
conferral of powers on such ordinary agencies could be questioned, this issue 
is seldom raised precisely because of the low intensity of the powers conferred. 
Obviously this is different for the agencies which Griller and Orator classify 
as pre-decision and decision-making agencies. The former provide the 
Commission with non-binding opinions,4 which the Commission however usu-
ally rubber-stamps when it takes the subsequent binding decision.5 The deci-
sion-making agencies take the binding decision themselves without the 
Commission intervening in the decision-making;6 in some cases, as well 
as their decision-making powers, they also provide the Commission with 
* Academic Assistant European Law, European Institute, Ghent University (Jean Monnet 
Centre of Excellence).
1. Although the first two agencies were established in the 1970s, the Union legislator only 
started to rely more heavily on the agency instrument in the 1990s.
2. See e.g. Busuioc, “Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agen-
cies”, 15 ELJ (2009), 600; Meuwese, Schuurmans and Voermans, “Towards a European Admin-
istrative Procedure Act?”, (2009) Review of European Administrative Law, 16; De Burca, “New 
modes of governance and the protection of human rights”, in Alston and De Schutter (Eds.), 
Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU (Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 28.
3. See Griller and Orator, “Everything under control? The ‘way forward’ for European agen-
cies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine”, 35 EL Rev. (2010), 1.
4. Examples include the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), etc.
5. See Meuwese, Schuurmans and Voermans, op. cit. supra note 2, 19.
6. Examples include the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM), the Com-
munity Plant Variety Office (CPVO), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency (ECHA), etc.
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non-binding advice. Compared to the ordinary agencies the latter two types 
have more considerable powers, although they are still a long way from being 
true regulatory agencies. Although the Union legislature has not yet established 
such US-style regulatory agencies, it may still be said that the agencification 
process in the EU has gone up another gear recently, as the Union legislature 
has now established decision-making agencies in what could be termed core 
sectors in economic regulation: the energy and financial sectors.7 The signifi-
cance of this conferral of “intense” prerogatives on EU agencies in the regula-
tion of highly controversial sectors should not be overlooked.
 The position of agencies in the EU Treaties is in sharp contrast to their 
mushrooming in practice. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
primary law was completely silent on the existence of agencies, let alone the 
possibility to endow them with specific tasks and powers. The Treaty of Lisbon 
changed this as the Article 263 TFEU now provides that the Court of Justice 
of the European Union can also review the legality of “acts of bodies, offices 
or agencies of the Union”.8 No further amendments in relation to agencies were 
made, meaning that primary law as it stands does not foresee the possibility 
of establishing an agency or conferring powers on it, but does foresee legal 
redress against acts of such agencies. Ever since the agencification of the Union 
administration started, the question as to the limits to a possible delegation of 
powers to agencies has not disappeared from the legal debate surrounding 
them. Virtually every author on the subject refers to the Meroni ruling from 
1958, although the ECJ itself never applied this ruling to any EU agency.9 This 
ruling was made under the ECSC Treaty and obviously did not concern an EU 
7. See Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, O.J. 2009, L 211/1; Regulation (EU) 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing 
Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/12; Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (Euro-
pean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/48; Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repeal-
ing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/84.
8. The scope of other Articles such as 265 and 267 TFEU has also been extended to acts of 
“bodies, offices or agencies”.
9. In a footnote in one of his Opinions, A.G. Geelhoed did postulate that the Meroni doctrine 
applies to the agencies, without however further arguing this point. See Opinion in Case 
C-378/00, Commission v. European Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I-937. In FMC Chem-
ical v. EFSA the applicant invoked the Meroni doctrine to challenge the legality of an opinion of 
the EFSA, but the Court concluded that the Commission had not delegated any power to adopt 
binding decisions. See Case T-311/06, FMC Chemical and Arysta Lifesciences v. EFSA, [2008] 
ECR II-88, para 66.
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agency, although it did concern a delegation of powers to a body not foreseen 
in the Treaty.
2. The Meroni devil
In the Meroni case,10 the applicant company challenged the way the High 
Authority had organized the financial arrangements of the ferrous scrap regime. 
Meroni questioned inter alia the underlying general decision in which the High 
Authority delegated the powers for the financial operation of the regime to two 
bodies under Belgian private law, the so-called Brussels Agencies. Meroni 
essentially argued that, according to Article 8 of the ECSC Treaty, the High 
Authority was held “to ensure that the objectives set out in th[at] Treaty are 
attained in accordance with the provisions thereof”, and that this did not leave 
any possibility for the High Authority to delegate its powers. The Court ruled 
somewhat differently, but to the same effect. It did not exclude the possibility 
of entrusting certain tasks to bodies established under private law, but after 
having laid down this general possibility it proceeded to substantially narrow 
it down. It referred to the general objectives of the Treaty as listed in Article 
3 ECSC and noted that it is not certain that they could all be simultaneously 
pursued in all circumstances and that reconciling these objectives in individual 
cases requires genuine discretionary power. The Court proceeded to draw atten-
tion to the provision in Article 3 ECSC that precedes the different objectives 
and in which it is stated that the institutions of the Community shall aim to 
achieve the objectives “within the framework of their respective powers and 
responsibilities and in the common interest”. This balance of powers was, 
according to the Court, characteristic of the institutional structure of the 
Community and was no less than a “fundamental guarantee granted by the 
Treaty, in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to 
which it applies”. The Court concluded that this guarantee would become inef-
fective if discretionary powers were to be entrusted to bodies other than those 
established by the Treaty.
 This affirmation together with the conditions that a delegation of executive 
powers has to meet, which the Court set out further in its judgment, have come 
to be known as the Meroni doctrine, and almost every author contributing to 
the legal debate on agencies refers to it, as was also remarked by Chiti in a 
previous contribution in this journal.11 Although most authors refer to the 
10. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgische S.p.A. v. High Authority, [1957–
1958] ECR 133.
11. Chiti, “An important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: Features, problems and 
perspectives of European agencies”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1420–4.
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Meroni ruling, few thoroughly analyse the judgment in relation to the EU 
agencies. This is in part unsurprising because simply transposing an unadapted 
Meroni doctrine to EU agencies would result in the conclusion that the current 
agencification is in breach with this doctrine, as some dissenting voices have 
indeed claimed.12 Instead, many authors make two important conclusions in 
respect of the Meroni ruling. First they conclude that the Meroni doctrine 
applies to current day agencies, but subsequently none of them can convinc-
ingly argue how the functioning of current EU agencies, notably the decision-
making agencies, can be reconciled with the prohibition to delegate 
discretionary powers laid down in Meroni.13 Secondly, it is generally concluded 
that it is the principle of institutional balance as laid down in Chernobyl,14 in 
Meroni still called the “balance of powers”, that prevents the agencies from 
being endowed with discretionary powers.15 I have argued against both these 
conclusions elsewhere,16 the issues undermining both conclusions will there-
fore only be briefly mentioned here.
 Firstly, the “balance of powers” which was invoked by the Court in Meroni 
is something very different from the current principle of “institutional balance”. 
Between the Meroni ruling and the principle as it stands now, a qualitative leap 
has occurred. To understand the reasoning of the Court in Meroni it makes no 
sense therefore to interpret the modern construction of “institutional balance”, 
instead one has to look at the meaning of the concept of “balance of powers” 
at the time of the Meroni ruling itself. As Jacqué points out, the principle 
was originally conceived as a substitute for the principle of the separation 
of powers of Montesquieu, the aim of which was to protect individuals 
against the abuse of power. According to Jacqué, this protective aspect of the 
principle seems gradually to have been lost as other means of protection 
12. Majone, “The credibility crisis of Community Regulation”, 38 JCMS (2000), 289; Hof-
mann and Türk, “Policy implementation”, in Hofmann and Türk (Eds.), EU Administrative Gov-
ernance (Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 89; Trondal, An Emergent European executive order (OUP, 
2010), p. 164.
13. Van Ooik for instance argues that OHIM’s functioning is in line with the Meroni doctrine 
given OHIM’s strict mandate, but a strict mandate does not mean an agency cannot wield discre-
tionary powers, as was confirmed in the Schräder case (cf. infra). See Van Ooik, “The growing 
importance of agencies in the EU: Shifting governance and the institutional balance”, in Curtin 
and Wessel (Eds.), Good governance and the European Union: Reflections on concepts, institu-
tions and substance (Intersentia, 2005), p. 151.
14. Case 70/88, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities, [1990] ECR 
I-2041.
15. According to Vos, the Court’s objections to agencies can even be reduced to this single 
objection: the distortion of the institutional balance. See Vos, “Agencies and the European 
Union”, in Zwart and Verhey (Eds.), Agencies in European and comparative perspective (Inter-
sentia, 2003), p. 131. 
16. Chamon, “EU agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine make sense?”, 17 MJ (2010), 281–
305.
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 appeared.17 Thus, the Court did not express a concern about the effect on the 
inter-institutional relations by referring to the “balance of powers”, but a con-
cern regarding the Treaty’s system of judicial protection. A close reading of 
Advocate General Roemer’s conclusion to this case,18 something few authors 
engage in,19 also supports this view. 
 Secondly, the differences between the factual and legal contexts in which 
the Brussels Agencies in Meroni and the current day EU agencies operate are 
fundamental in nature. The Brussels Agencies were bodies established under 
private law, whereas the EU agencies are public bodies under EU law. Although 
it makes perfect sense to qualify the former as “outside bodies”, this is not so 
for the latter. The Brussels Agencies had received powers from the High 
Authority, whereas EU agencies are established and endowed with powers by 
the Union legislature. Moreover, the ruling in Meroni was given under the 
ECSC Treaty, whereas the current EU agencies operate under the EU Treaties. 
Although the Meroni ruling is still being cited to this day by the Court,20 one 
cannot ignore the fundamental differences between the two international orga-
nizations.
 In a way this changed context has even already left its mark on the case law 
of the Court. The Schräder case is exemplary in this regard. In Schräder, the 
General Court accepted that the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), an 
agency, could exercise discretionary powers and referred to the wide margin 
of discretion a Union authority enjoys whenever it has to make a complex 
assessment in the performance of its duties. The General Court further argued 
this by referring to the discretionary powers the Commission wields in the 
Common Agricultural Policy and in its control on State aid, ignoring the fact 
that it was dealing with an agency and not the Commission itself.21 In a way, 
the General Court was forced to legalize the CPVO’s powers given the legal 
and political context in which the EU administration operates today. A differ-
ent approach towards the issues of delegation and the allocation of tasks 
between the different institutions and bodies indeed seems justified in the 
context of the traité cadre of the EU, compared to the traité loi of the ECSC.
 Although this latter issue was more extensively debated in legal doctrine,22 
the other issues have not received as much attention. It is not claimed here that 
17. Jacqué, “The Principle of Institutional Balance”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 384.
18. Opinion of A.G. Roemer in Meroni, cited supra note 10, 89.
19. A notable exception being Griller and Orator who briefly refer to the A.G.’s Opinion, cf. 
Griller and Orator, op. cit. supra note 3, 17.
20. See e.g. Case C-301/02 P, Carmine Salvatore Tralli v. ECB, [2005] ECR I-4071; Joined 
Cases C-154 & 155/04, The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Others 
v. Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales, [2005] ECR I-6451.
21. Case T-187/06, Schräder v. CPVO, [2008] ECR II-3151.
22. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance”, (2002) 
Jean Monnet Working Papers 2, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020201.html, (Last 
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these issues make the Meroni doctrine irrelevant for the EU agencies, but it 
should nonetheless be clear that the current debate would benefit from a more 
thorough analysis of the Meroni doctrine. This is something which was also 
remarked by Chiti,23 and also by Zwart, the latter also proposing another alter-
native reading of the Meroni ruling.24 A more thorough analysis of the ruling 
would clarify to what degree the doctrine still is relevant today and especially 
in relation to the functioning of EU agencies. Given the original meaning of 
the principle of “balance of powers” it seems more appropriate to stress the 
importance of a system of effective judicial protection when referring to the 
Meroni ruling, than it is to stress the institutional balance.25
3. And the Romano deep blue sea
The problems highlighted above related to a simple transposition of the Meroni 
doctrine to the EU agencies do not only necessitate a more thorough analysis 
of that judgment, but also compel us to look for other rulings in the case law 
of the Court. The Romano ruling is another interesting case concerning delega-
tion of powers, but it is mentioned by fewer authors and analysed by none. It 
will be argued in the following that this ruling is more relevant to the EU agen-
cies than Meroni is, and an analysis will be undertaken to attempt to clarify 
the implications of that ruling for the process of agencification.
 Aside from referring to the Meroni doctrine, which virtually all authors do, 
some contributors to the legal debate on EU agencies also refer to Romano, a 
far less well known ruling by the ECJ. The reason why only a minority of 
authors writing on agencies deal with the implications of the Romano ruling 
is unclear, all the more since at least three fundamental aspects differentiate 
Romano from Meroni, bringing it closer to the factual and legal situation the 
EU agencies operate in today. For one, the Romano case was ruled on under 
the EEC Treaty and not, as with Meroni, under the ECSC Treaty. Secondly, 
one of the central issues in Romano was the delegation of powers by the leg-
islator, in casu the Council, not by the Commission or High Authority. Lastly 
accessed: 18/02/2011); Geradin, “The development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the 
EU should learn from the American Experience”, 11 CJEL (2004), 1.
23. Chiti, op. cit. supra note 11. 
24. Zwart, “La poursuite du Père Meroni ou pourquoi les agences pourraient jouer un rôle 
plus en vue dans l’Union Européenne”, in Dutheil de la Rochère (Ed.), L’Exécution du Droit de 
l’Union, entre Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux (Bruylant, 2009), pp. 159–73.
25. This is not to say the principle of institutional balance is irrelevant to the process of agen-
cification, but that principle cannot as such be derived from the Meroni ruling. See also Chamon, 
op. cit. supra note 16.
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the delegatee in the Romano case was a body established under secondary law 
and not a body established by private law.
 The main issue in Romano, without going into the details of the facts of the 
case, brought before the ECJ under the preliminary ruling procedure, was the 
problem of a diminution of the value of the Italian lira vis-à-vis the Belgian 
Franc, between the time when Mr Romano was entitled to his Italian invalid-
ity pension and the time the payment of the pension was executed. Because 
Mr Romano already received a provisional Belgian invalidity pension for part 
of the same period, the Belgian insurance institution, L’Institut national 
d’assurance maladie-invalidité (INAMI), decided that the latter pension should 
be adjusted proportionately upon receipt of the Italian pension. The INAMI 
amended the original decision granting a Belgian pension to Mr Romano and 
reduced the amount awarded, additionally specifying that the provisional 
advances it had already granted would also be recovered. However, in order 
to do so, the INAMI used a different exchange rate to convert the sum received 
by it from its Italian counterpart from the rate used to calculate the amount to 
be recovered, which resulted in a situation whereby it retained an amount 
higher than the amount of benefits actually paid over the period in question. 
The INAMI justified the use of different exchange rates by referring to deci-
sion No 101 of the Administrative Commission on Social Security of Migrant 
Workers, to which the Council had granted power to fix the conversion rates 
applicable under Article 107 of Regulation 574/72. The question whether the 
INAMI was bound by this decision ultimately gave rise, as the Advocate Gen-
eral noted in his opinion,26 to a point of a constitutional nature: the question 
whether the Council, in Article 107 of Regulation 574/72, could confer legis-
lative power on the Administrative Commission.27 The Administrative Com-
mission had been established by the Council through Article 80 of the 
ubiquitous Regulation 1408/71, its tasks laid down in Article 81 of the same 
Regulation.
 Both the Advocate General and the Court concluded, without referring to 
the Meroni ruling, that such a conferral of powers was incompatible with the 
Treaties, in particular with the then Article 155 EEC (later Art. 211 EC, now 
repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon and in substance replaced by Arts. 290 and 
291 TFEU), enabling the Council to confer implementing powers on the Com-
mission and Articles 173 and 177 EEC (Arts. 263 and 267 TFEU), laying down 
26. Opinion of A.G. Warner in Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano v. Institut national d’assurance 
maladie-invalidité, [1981] ECR 1259.
27. Already in 1966 Maas pointed – in this journal – to the “institutional curiosity” of the 
Administrative Commission and answered this question in the negative since, under the Treaties, 
no legislative or executive powers could be conferred upon it. See Maas, “The Administrative 
Commission for the Social Security of Migrant Workers”, 4 CML Rev. (1966), 51–63.
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the judicial system created by the Treaty.28 The Advocate General did not 
elaborate on the conformity of the competence conferred on the Administrative 
Commission with Article 155 EEC much, only briefly noting that nothing in 
the Treaty suggests that the Council may delegate legislative power to a body 
such as the Administrative Commission. With regard to the problem such a 
delegation poses in the light of Articles 173 and 177 TFEU his analysis was 
more thorough. According to the Advocate General, Articles 173 and 177 EEC 
gave the Court jurisdiction to rule on the validity and interpretation of acts of 
Community institutions, be it directly or indirectly, but the Administrative 
Commission, whose decision was at the heart of the case at hand, was not a 
Community institution mentioned in Article 4 EEC (current Art. 13 TEU) and 
therefore, according to the Advocate General, its acts were not subject to judi-
cial review by the Court. The Advocate General sketched the underlying fun-
damental problem succinctly by stating 
“The idea that there may be set up for the Community an administrative 
body empowered to make binding decisions, but whose decisions are, in 
themselves, incapable of review by this Court seems to me incompatible 
with the scheme of the Treaty. Nor does it seem to me that the concept of 
an administrative body whose decisions are incapable of judicial review is 
reconcilable with constitutional principles that are accepted in all the 
member States and, I think, in every other civilized country.”29 
Just like Advocate General Roemer in Meroni, the principal concern of 
Advocate General Warner seemed to be the requirements of a waterproof sys-
tem of judicial protection. As usual, the Court itself was very concise, simply 
stating: 
“[I]t follows both from Article 155 of the Treaty and the judicial system 
created by the Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 and 177 thereof, 
that a body such as the Administrative Commission may not be empow-
ered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of Law.” 
Unfortunately, the Court did not dwell upon this point further and simply con-
cluded that the national court (and the national social security institution) was, 
as a result, simply not bound by decision of the Administrative Commission. 
 Because of this conciseness, there is no consensus between the different 
legal authors that do refer to the Romano judgment on the precise meaning of 
this ruling and how it relates to the principles laid down in the Meroni judg-
28. Romano, cited supra note 26, para 20.
29. Opinion in Romano, cited supra note 26, at p. 1265.
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ment. According to Comte, Romano simply confirms Meroni.30 Geradin con-
curs with this, but notes that the two should still be distinguished, as the Court 
did not explicitly rely on the principle of institutional balance in Romano.31 
This should be juxtaposed with Griller and Orator, who claim that it was the 
institutional balance already cited in Meroni that was central to the prohibition 
to delegate legislative powers on institutions other than those which were 
attributed by the Treaty.32 Indeed, Griller and Orator’s view carries more weight 
on this point as Article 155 EEC prescribed the possibility for the Council to 
empower the Commission to implement the rules it had itself, acting as legis-
lator, laid down. Delegating this power to a body other than the Commission 
could then be seen as encroaching on the powers and prerogatives of another 
institution, in casu the Commission, which is one of the three sub-principles 
constituting the principle of institutional balance according to Lenaerts and 
Verhoeven.33 Interestingly the latter two authors do not classify the Romano 
judgment under that sub-principle but under another one, to wit the prohibition 
for institutions to unconditionally assign their powers to other institutions. 
Doubt may be cast upon such a classification, as the Court referred to Article 
155 EEC, which did not deal with the powers of the Council, which were laid 
down in Article 145 EEC, but with the powers of the Commission. This would 
suggest that it was not so much the delegation by the Council which bothered 
the Court, but the fact that the Council did not delegate the task to the Com-
mission, instead choosing to attribute it to another body. 
 Although the institutional balance, through Article 155 EEC, was part of 
the Court’s reasoning in Romano, it cannot be said with certainty to have made 
up the core of the Court’s resistance against the delegation of powers to the 
Administrative Commission, as Griller and Orator seem to suggest. Such a 
definite conclusion on this crucial element in the Romano judgment seems 
impossible to make given the scant reasoning of the judges. The more thorough 
analysis by the Advocate General would even seem to point in the opposite 
direction, as the Advocate General insisted not so much on Article 155 EEC 
but on the judicial system created by the Treaties. Remmert indeed suggests 
that it was because of this lacuna in judicial protection that the Administrative 
Commission could not wield external competences.34 Although Koenig and 
30. Comte, “Agences européennes: relance d’une réflexion interinstitutionelle européenne?”, 
(2008) Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, 495.
31. Geradin, op. cit. supra note 22, 10.
32. Griller and Orator, op. cit. supra note 3, 18.
33. Lenaerts and Verhoeven, “Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for democracy in EU 
Governance”, in Joerges and Dehousse (Eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market 
(OUP, 2001), pp. 44–45.
34. Remmert, “Die Gründung von Einrichtungen der mittelbaren Gemeinschaftsverwal-
tung”, 37 EuR (2003), 140.
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others assert that Meroni and Romano show a restrictive approach of the Court, 
they only conclude from those two judgments that comprehensive law-making 
powers may not be delegated.35 Unfortunately, this in no way helps to clarify 
these judgments or the relation between them. The authors do not further 
clarify the concept of “comprehensive law-making powers” and it was not 
used in either of the rulings. What is precisely meant by this concept therefore 
remains unclear and one can imagine a plethora of acts and measures which 
may have important (legal) repercussions without however meeting the char-
acteristics of acts laid down by a body exerting “comprehensive law-making 
powers”. Lastly, according to Türk, the Romano ruling did not just confirm 
but even went beyond the Meroni judgment, and restricted the possibilities for 
delegation even further, the practical consequence being that delegating deci-
sion-making powers to outside bodies is unlawful under the Treaties.36 Although 
Türk is alone in his claim that Romano forbids any delegation of decision-
making powers, other authors have not ventured dealing with the Court’s state-
ment that a body such as the Administrative Commission could not adopt “acts 
having the force of Law” either. Thus, although some authors do mention 
Romano together with Meroni, none of them have undertaken to clarify the 
relation between these two judgments. Neither have they tried to explain how 
the Romano judgment can still leave room for EU agencies such as OHIM, 
CPVO, EASA and ECHA, that have been granted the power to take binding 
decisions (see supra note 6). Thus the question of the practical implications 
of this part of the judgment is still open. 
 Whether Türk is correct in his assertion that decision-making powers may 
not be delegated to outside bodies ultimately depends on how “force of Law” 
is construed. Türk himself seems to interpret this as the legal force making a 
decision or an act binding, an interpretation which is sustainable based on the 
English text of the judgment. However, in the French, Dutch and German 
language versions of the judgment, the Court refers to actes revetant un car-
actère normatif, normatieve besluiten and rec htsakte mit normativem charak-
ter. Acts having the force of Law could then be read as legislative measures, 
i.e. bindings acts of general application, but excluding those that lack such 
general application, possibly leaving open the possibility for bodies such as 
the Administrative Commission or the above mentioned agencies to adopt 
binding acts in individual cases. The Court’s second assertion in paragraph 20 
35. Koenig, Loetz and Fechtner, “Do we really need a European agency for market regula-
tion?”, 43 Intereconomics (2008), 231.
36. Türk, “Case Law in the Area of the Implementation of EC Law”, in Pedler and Schaefer 
(Eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Polit-
ical Process (European Institute of Public Administration, 1996), p. 186.
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of the Romano judgment, stating the Administrative Commission may only 
provide aid, but cannot issue binding interpretations or instructions, should 
then be understood as a clarification of the first part of paragraph 20 and not 
as a novel requirement also excluding binding action even if it did not consti-
tute a legislative measure.37 Although the current state of agencification would 
still be compatible with such a reading of the Court’s ruling, such a literal 
interpretation of the Court’s affirmation would also run counter to the original 
premise in both the Court’s and the Advocate General’s reasoning. Whether a 
decision is of a general or individual scope does not appear to be relevant in 
the light of the Treaty Articles invoked by the Court and Advocate General. 
Thus, if one stays true to the underlying reasoning apparent in the Romano 
judgment, the scope of the prohibition contained in that judgment should 
indeed be broadened to any binding decision whether of general or individual 
application, as Türk suggested.
 Assuming such a construction of the Court’s ruling holds true, this in itself 
does not yet clarify how current EU agencies may operate in the institutional 
architecture and, more specifically, which powers may be conferred to them. 
Since the Romano judgment, the Treaties have been amended five times 
through major Treaty revisions. Not only were the scope and pervasiveness of 
EU law altered, but precisely those articles the Court cited as an obstacle to 
delegating powers to the Administrative Commission were amended as well. 
Therefore, to have a proper understanding of the relevance of the Romano 
judgment for the EU agencies today, the following issues need to be explored. 
Firstly, whether the Treaty revisions enacted since the Romano judgment have 
accommodated the concerns raised in that judgment. And secondly, whether 
the legal and political context the agencies operate in today, and which is dif-
ferent from the legal and political context the Administrative Commission 
operated in, could provide us with possible reservations on applying the prin-
ciple laid down in Romano to the agencies.
37. In a subsequent ruling, the Court referred back to Romano and the prohibition laid down 
therein, but used the term “legislative measures”  instead of “acts having the force of law” which 
was the phrase actually used in Romano; see Case C-102/91, Doris Knoch v. Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit, [1992] ECR I-4341, para 52. This seems to confirm that the prohibition laid down in 
Romano did concern “legislative measures”. Later case law, however, did not use the term leg-
islative measures in relation to the prohibition in Romano any more. See Case 21/87, Felix 
Borowitz v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte, [1988] ECR 3715; Case C-202/97, 
 Fitzwilliam Executive Search Ltd v. Bestuur van het Landelijk instituut sociale verzekeringen, 
[2000] ECR I-883.
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4. Assessment of the Treaty revisions
4.1. The implementing powers of the Commission: Article 155 EEC
Already under the Rome Treaties, the Commission’s competence to adopt 
implementing measures was foreseen in Article 155, fourth indent, EEC. 
Although this competence of the Commission had existed since 1957, it was 
strengthened by the entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA), more 
specifically the amendments introduced by it to then Article 145 EEC. Article 
10 of the SEA added a third indent to Article 145 EEC, laying down the basis 
for the comitology system in primary law, and charging the institutions with 
the task of establishing a framework for the delegation of these implementing 
powers and for the committees assisting the Commission.38 Labouz rightly 
noted that it would have been much more logical to amend the existing article,39 
instead of inserting this provision in another article, which gave the impression 
of redundancy, as Blumann remarked.40 The Commission had indeed proposed 
to the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the SEA to amend the existing 
Article 155 EEC to this end,41 but ultimately the Member States opted to insert 
a new provision in the Treaty. According to Ehlerman this was because the 
Member States feared the solution proposed by the Commission would have 
left it with a general and autonomous executive power.42 Still the power of the 
Commission was strengthened through the SEA, since the amendment to 
Article 145 EEC created an obligation for the Council to confer implementing 
powers to the Commission,43 whereas conferring these powers to the 
Commission under Article 155 EEC was merely optional.44 After the renum-
bering following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Articles 145 
and 155 EEC became Articles 202 and 211 EC. Both latter articles were 
38. Usher, “The Institutions of the European Communities after the Single European Act”, 
19 Bracton Law Journal (1987), 68.
39. Labouz, “L’Acte unique européen”, (1986) Revue Quebecoise de Droit International, 
139.
40. Blumann, “Le pouvoir exécutif de la commission à la lumière de l’Acte unique euro-
péen”, 24 RTDE (1988), 1.
41. Glaesner, “The Single European Act: Attempt at an appraisal”, (1987) Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal, 469; Lonbay, “Reforming the European Community”, (1987) Holdsworth 
Law Review, 105.
42. Ehlermann, “Compétences d’exécution conférées à la commission: la nouvelle décision-
cadre du Conseil”, 31 RMC (1988), 233.
43. Glaesner, op. cit. supra note 41, 469. For an elaborate analysis of the obligation on the 
part of the Council to confer powers on the Commission see Blumann, op. cit. supra note 40, 
30–32.
44. Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt 
& Co, [1970] ECR 1161, para 9.
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repealed by the Lisbon Treaty, and the respective indents dealing with the 
implementation powers of the Commission were in substance reproduced in 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, thereby removing the illogicality noted by Labouz 
(see supra) from the Treaties. Thus, since the Romano judgment, the rules 
concerning the delegation of implementing powers by the Council to the 
Commission, originally provided for in Article 155 EEC, have profoundly 
changed. The key question here is not so much how the relationship between 
the Commission and the legislature (the Council, since Maastricht ever more 
together with the Parliament) has changed, but whether these changes have 
had repercussions for the concern expressed by the Court in Romano. As 
Lenaerts notes, the Court intended to preserve the Commission’s role of execu-
tive lawmaker by referring to Article 155 EEC and this concern was only made 
stronger through the amendments brought by Article 10 of the SEA.45 Although 
there is some debate over whether the new Articles 290 and 291 TFEU have 
strengthened the position of the Commission or not,46 what can easily be ascer-
tained is that only delegation to the Commission is foreseen. This is clear in 
Article 290, introducing delegated acts which replace the comitology decisions 
adopted under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (PRAC), giving the leg-
islator the possibility to delegate the power to adopt non-legislative acts of 
general application,47 only to the Commission. Although Parliament and 
Council have a large margin of discretion to decide the conditions of this del-
egation, the list in Article 290(2) TFEU not being exhaustive,48 only delegation 
to the Commission is provided for. Article 291 TFEU lays down the principle 
of national implementation of EU law in paragraph 1. If however implementa-
tion at EU level is deemed necessary for the uniform implementation of EU 
law, powers may be conferred on the Commission and in exceptional cases on 
the Council. There would seem to be no room left for the legislator to delegate 
powers through legislative acts to institutions other than the Commission (and 
in exceptional cases the Council). If the reference by the Court in Romano to 
Article 155 EEC should be understood as clarifying to the legislator (in casu 
the Council, but now predominantly Council and Parliament) that it is at liberty 
45. Lenaerts, “Regulating the regulatory process: ‘Delegation of powers’ in the European 
Community”, 18 EL Rev. (1993), 47.
46. According to Barents, the new provisions have weakened the position of the Commis-
sion. See Barents, Het Verdrag van Lissabon, Achtergronden en commentaar (Kluwer, 2008), 
pp. 461–2. But Craig sees a reinforcement of the Commission, see Craig, “The Hierarchy of 
Norms”, in Tridimas and Nebbia (Eds.), European Union law for the twenty-first century: 
rethinking the new legal order (Hart, 2004), pp. 80–84.
47. Notwithstanding Art. 290 TFEU describes the delegated acts as non-legislative acts, they 
are legislation in a substantive sense. See also Driessen, “Delegated legislation after the Treaty 
of Lisbon: An analysis of Article 290 TFEU”, 35 EL Rev. (2010) 837, 838.
48. Barents, op. cit. supra note 46, p. 461. 
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to decide whether or not to delegate certain tasks,49 but that once a decision to 
delegate is made, the delegatee may only be the Commission, it is clear that 
the successive treaty revisions have not detracted from this at all.
4.1. 1. A brief digression on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and the regulatory 
powers of the newly established agencies in the financial sector 
The recent establishment of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
in the financial sector has, as was already briefly mentioned above, marked a 
new step in the process of agencification. Their establishment has further high-
lighted the problem agencification poses under the current Treaty Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU. The Commission’s declaration, following the Council’s 
approval of the draft regulations for the establishment of the ESAs, on the 
compatibility of those regulations with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU,50 provides 
a good example in this regard. 
 As explained, under Article 290 TEU only the Commission has the power 
to adopt delegated acts, which allow the EU executive to flesh out a policy 
within the framework laid down by the Union legislator. Giving the Commis-
sion a carte blanche, subject to the legislator’s scrutiny under Article 290(2) 
TFEU, to further regulate the financial sector through delegated acts, obviously 
was too ambitious a step for the Member States. This is why an important role 
in the adoption of delegated acts was foreseen for the ESAs, which, just like 
any agency, are a halfway house between regulatory policy at the national level 
and regulatory policy by the Commission.51 The regulations establishing the 
ESAs foresee that they can propose draft regulatory technical standards to the 
Commission, who will then endorse them by means of delegated acts. This 
technique in itself is not new, as agencies such as the EASA (European Avia-
tion Safety Agency) can also propose new regulations to the Commission. What 
is new and what bothers the Commission is that the relevant regulations fore-
see that the draft regulatory technical standards submitted by an Authority 
“should be subject to amendment only in very restricted and extraordinary 
circumstances, since the Authority is the actor in close contact with and 
49. An obligation on the part of the legislator to delegate implementing powers to the Com-
mission (or Council) does exist under Art. 291(2) TFEU, once it is established that uniform 
conditions for the implementation of EU law are needed, since that paragraph provides, inter 
alia, “Where uniform conditions ... are needed, those acts shall confer…”
50. The Commission declaration was an addendum to the Council document, Council of the 
European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council estab-
lishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, 15649/10, ADD 1, 10 Nov. 2010. The 
Commission made identical statements for the other two authorities (in docs 15647/10 ADD1 
and 15648/10 ADD1). The adopted regulations are cited in note 7 supra.
51. See also Chamon, op. cit. supra note 16, 286–287.
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 knowing best the daily functioning of financial markets.”52 It is clear this 
substantially limits the Commission’s discretion and is hard to justify based 
on the wording of Article 290 TFEU, the latter only foreseeing a role for the 
Commission and the Union legislator in the adoption of delegated acts. As 
Driessen points out, the main difference between the delegated act and a deci-
sion adopted under the PRAC, which the former replaces, is that any opinion 
the Commission receives from national experts, which of course is still pos-
sible under Article 290 TFEU,53 is now without any legal effect.54 However, 
in the new regulations on financial supervision, the legislator has made clear 
that the draft regulatory technical standards adopted by the ESAs would have 
legal effect. Effectively, the Commission is bound to these drafts in a similar 
way as it is already bound to the opinions of pre-decision-making agencies 
which are de iure non-binding. Yet the legal fiction of the Commission retain-
ing all decisional power has now also been partly abandoned. Thus, this com-
petence of the ESAs does not only impinge upon the prerogatives of the 
Commission; it also implies that the ESAs wield quasi-legislative powers, 
subject to the limited scrutiny of the Commission, who also still formally 
adopts the delegated acts.
 As regards the adoption of implementing technical standards by means of 
implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU, the regulations also foresee an 
important role for the ESAs. A general rule, subject to exceptions, is introduced, 
according to which the Commission can only adopt an implementing act if the 
relevant ESA has submitted a draft to it. This again limits the power of the 
Commission, as the three new ESAs replace the three financial services Com-
mittees who under the old regime also participated in policy making by giving 
their opinion on draft measures proposed by the Commission under the comi-
tology procedures. Now these Committees have been upgraded into Authorities 
and they themselves propose draft measures to the Commission. Again this is 
hard to justify based on the wording of Article 291 TFEU. 
 Although an important part of the policy making has been delegated to the 
ESAs, the Commission still formally adopts the delegated and implementing 
acts. Moloney argues this was a pragmatic constitutional fix, aimed at  resolving 
52. The preambles of the various regulations further provide for the following restricted and 
extraordinary circumstances: “Draft regulatory technical standards would be subject to amend-
ment if they were incompatible with Union law, did not respect the principle of proportionality 
or ran counter to the fundamental principles of the internal market for financial services as 
reflected in the acquis of Union financial services legislation.”
53. See also Declaration No 39 on Article 290 TFEU, annexed to the Final Act of the Inter-
governmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, in which the Conference took 
note of the Commission’s intention to continue to consult experts appointed by the Member 
States in the preparation of draft delegated acts in the financial services area. 
54. Driessen, op. cit. supra note 47, 848.
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the difficulties the Meroni doctrine creates.55 The doctrine’s shadow is indeed 
apparent in the regulations, as it is also expressly provided that the “regulatory 
technical standards shall be technical, shall not imply strategic decisions or 
policy choices and [that] their content shall be delimited by the legislative acts 
on which they are based.”56 In reality, however, such an assumed clear distinc-
tion between technical issues and policy choices does not exist, as is already 
well recognized in legal literature on agencies.57 It can furthermore be doubted 
whether reserving the formal power to adopt these measures for the Commis-
sion, whereas the real decisions are made by the ESAs, is truly in line with the 
Meroni doctrine. This latter issue is of course also relevant in the light of 
Romano.58 Thus the Commission in its declaration was right to express its 
doubts whether the restrictions on its role are in line with Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU. It should equally be pointed out, however, that the powers conferred 
on previously established agencies already undermine the Commission’s role 
under the current Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The new powers conferred on 
the ESAs can therefore be seen as a continuation of an already ongoing evolu-
tion.
4.2. The system of judicial protection under the Treaties: Articles 173 and 177 
EEC
The second cornerstone of the Court’s critique in Romano on the delegation 
of powers to the Administrative Commission was its insistence on the judicial 
system as laid down in Articles 173 and 177 EEC (now 263 and 267 TFEU). 
Just as the system governing the delegation of implementing powers to the 
Commission has undergone several changes through the successive treaty revi-
sions since the Romano judgment, so has the system of judicial protection. 
Although these changes were many and fundamental in nature, and their intro-
duction was the result of the constitutional evolution of the Community (now 
Union), only the most notable changes for the problem at hand will be dealt 
with. These relevant amendments to the Union’s system of judicial protection 
55. Moloney, “EU financial market regulation after the global financial crisis: ‘More Europe’ 
or More Risks?”, 47 CML Rev., 1347.
56. Art. 10(1) of Regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010, cited supra note 7. This 
provision is of course also relevant in the light of Art. 290(1) TFEU, which clarifies that the 
essential elements should be laid down by the legislator and cannot be amended by the Commis-
sion through delegated acts.
57. See e.g. Griller and Orator, op. cit. supra note 3, 22; Wittinger, “Europäische Satelliten: 
Anmerkungen zum Europäischen Agentur(un)wesen und zur Vereinbarkeit Europäischer Agen-
turen mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 42 EuR (2008), 619.
58. However, when proposing drafts to the Commission, the ESAs act as pre-decision-mak-
ing agencies, whereas Romano is especially relevant as regards the decision-making agencies.
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were only introduced through the latest revision by the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
current Article 263 TFEU now allows actions for annulment of “acts of bodies, 
offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties.” Likewise, Article 267 TFEU gives the Court of Justice jurisdic-
tion to rule on the validity and interpretation of “acts of the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union.” Whether this extension of the jurisdiction 
of the Court actually strengthens the system of judicial protection under the 
Treaties is another matter. In relation to acts of agencies specifically, the juris-
diction of the Court had already been extended through the establishing regu-
lations of those agencies, albeit in an unsatisfactory and ultimately illegal way, 
as the Court’s powers of review may only be laid down in the Treaties them-
selves and cannot be extended through secondary law.59 More generally, many 
authors have referred to the Les Verts case law, where the Court ruled that in 
a Community based on the rule of law, no measure adopted by one of its insti-
tutions may be exempt from judicial review by the Court.60 Lenaerts, for 
instance, concluded that based on this case law the Court could accept juris-
diction to review the acts of bodies established through secondary law regard-
less of whether that legislation provides for this possibility or not.61 Remmert 
on the other hand noted that the problem the Court faced in Les Verts was not 
quite comparable to such situations, as in Les Verts it was faced with a lacuna 
in the system of legal remedies and procedures concerning the functioning of 
an institution established by the Treaties themselves and not by a body estab-
lished through secondary legislation.62 Nevertheless, the General Court decided 
in Sogelma63 that such situations are indeed identical to the situation in Les 
Verts when it rejected a plea of inadmissibility raised by the European Agency 
for Reconstruction (EAR) in an action for annulment against a decision of that 
agency. The EAR had claimed the General Court had no jurisdiction since the 
EAR was not mentioned in the former Article 230 EC as one of the institutions 
whose acts could be reviewed by the Court. In its decision, the Court probably 
felt strengthened by the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon was soon to be ratified. 
Riedel indeed rightly notes that the Court anticipated the new rules under the 
TFEU in its interpretation of the rules under the EC Treaty.64 Thus, interesting 
59. Court of Auditors, Opinion No 8/2001 on a proposal for a Council Regulation laying 
down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of 
Community programmes, O.J. 2001, C 345/1, para 22. 
60. Case 294/83, Parti écologiste «Les Verts» v. European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339, 
para 23.
61. Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 45, 45–6. 
62. Remmert, op. cit. supra note 34, 140.
63. Case T-411/06, Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v. European Agency for 
Reconstruction, [2008] ECR II-2771.
64. Riedel, “Rechtsschutz gegen Akte Europäischer Agenturen”, 20 EuZW (2009), 568.
1072  Chamon CML Rev. 2011
as the discussion might have been, it has been relegated to the realm of legal 
history by the Treaty of Lisbon, which has extended the Court’s jurisdiction 
in the proper legal way, i.e. by amendment of the Treaty itself. In the same 
way, the objection of Advocate General Warner in the Romano case against an 
empowerment of a body to make binding decisions and his qualification of 
such an empowerment as incompatible with the scheme of the Treaty can now 
be swept aside, as the former Articles 173 and 177 EEC have been amended 
giving jurisdiction to the Court to review such decisions. 
 Thus we are left feeling a bit abandoned. We know from the Romano ruling 
that Articles 155, 173 and 177 EEC stood in the way of a delegation of deci-
sion-making powers by the legislature to a body other than the Commission. 
But only one part of this two-pronged objection had been elaborated, and even 
then only by the Advocate General. As the Treaty of Lisbon has done away 
with this first part of the Court’s objection, the relevance of Romano for the 
current agencies comes down to the requirements of the former Article 155 
EEC (in substance replaced by Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU). As the Court did not 
clarify its reasoning in its judgment, discovering these precise requirements 
comes down to conjecture, given the possibility that these requirements might 
have been altered through the successive treaty revisions. Assuming the fourth 
indent of the former Article 155 EEC can indeed be identified as the stumbling 
block leading the Court to rule as it did in Romano, and that the Court implied 
that implementing powers should either be exercised by the Council or the 
Commission, it is clear that the second part of the Court’s objection is still 
valid. The Treaties as they currently stand, do not provide for the power to 
implement EU law other than by the Council, Commission or the Member 
States, excluding the possibility for another EU body or institution to wield 
executive powers.
5. A changed context
Although the facts of the case and the legal context of Romano resemble the 
situation in which the current agencies operate much better than the Meroni 
ruling, important differences remain. Notwithstanding that this in itself would 
not overrule the Romano judgment, it can give extra weight to a plea for revis-
ing the existing case law of the Court, to accommodate for the existence of EU 
agencies and their participation in EU policy implementation.65
65. A plea already made by some authors specifically for the Meroni doctrine. See e.g. 
 Geradin, op. cit. supra note 22, 16. 
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 Undoubtedly the core of such an argument would relate to what Majone has 
coined “the rise of the regulatory State in Europe”.66 Although the regulatory 
State paradigm cannot be dealt with in extenso here, the repercussions of this 
evolution on the central issue at hand should be pointed out. As Majone 
explains, the rise of the regulatory State in Europe is not just a national but 
also a supranational phenomenon. According to Majone regulatory growth in 
the EU started in the 1970s and has been exponential, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Not only has the amount of legislation enacted at European level 
increased dramatically since the 1970s, the scope and pervasiveness of EU 
regulation has too.67 The importance of the SEA, which attributed new com-
petences to the then EEC, is obvious in this regard. Although there was a clear 
evolution in expanding the competences of the Community, a similar evolution 
in its institutional architecture, to match the newly gained competences did 
not materialize. According to Everson and Majone, this created an institutional 
deficit.68 To remedy this institutional deficit, auxiliary bodies could be set up 
to support the Treaty institutions and especially the Commission in their (new) 
tasks, thus making the case for EU agencies. The analogy of the establishment 
of numerous regulatory agencies in the United States following the New Deal 
program in the 1930s seems evident and is therefore also often made.69
 Returning to the Romano ruling, it should be recalled that this judgment was 
delivered in 1981 at the start of the regulatory growth at the European level 
and well before the SEA and the subsequent Treaty revisions that broadened 
the scope of EU law immensely. The institutional deficit indicated by Majone 
had not yet materialized, and an acute organizational need to delegate certain 
tasks to bodies not mentioned in the Treaties did not yet exist. Hence the out-
come of the Romano ruling was quite logical in 1981 given the state of Euro-
pean law at that time: the Council could have easily taken the necessary 
binding decisions itself instead of the Administrative Commission or it could 
have delegated this task to the Commission, not yet overburdened at that time. 
In both cases, judicial review of such decisions would have been available, 
given that the authors of the acts would have been either the Council or Com-
mission. Since the broadening of the then Article 173 EEC by the Court in its 
Les Verts ruling only dates from 1986, this could not be presumed to be the 
66. Majone, “The rise of the regulatory State in Europe”, (1994) West European Politics, 77.
67. Majone, “The rise of statutory regulation in Europe”, in Majone (Ed.), Regulating Europe 
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 56–9.
68. Everson and Majone, “Réforme institutionelle: agences indépendantes, surveillance, co -
ordination et contrôle procédural”, in De Schutter, Lebesis and Paterson (Eds.), La Gouvernance 
dans l’Union Européenne (Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 
2001), pp. 144–50.
69. See e.g. van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 13, 125.
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case for a body such as the Administrative Commission. In short in 1981, there 
was no good reason to delegate powers to a body such as the Administrative 
Commission and this delegation would even have created problems concerning 
the system of judicial protection under the Treaty.70 However, at the beginning 
of the 21st century, the EU markedly differs from the EEC in 1981 and no one 
questions the need to delegate certain implementing tasks to bodies other than 
the Commission and the Council. Unfortunately, as Hofmann remarks, although 
the framers of the Treaty of Lisbon provided for a new system of delegated 
and implementing acts under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, they essentially 
ignored the agencies in this regard,71 yet agencies take an ever increasing role, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, in EU policy implementation. 
 Although these observations could help the Court review its case law should 
it be confronted with a similar question to the one raised in Romano and 
Meroni, this time concerning powers conferred on an agency, and they have 
probably already led the Court to take a relaxed stance towards agencies (see 
for instance Schräder, supra), it is not clear how the Court could rule such a 
case without applying a contra legem, or at the very least a praeter legem, 
interpretation of the Treaty articles on implementation. The Treaty of Lisbon 
did indeed provide an excellent opportunity to close the “institutional deficit”, 
but the delegation of implementing powers at EU level is still explicitly 
reserved to the Commission or, in exceptional cases, the Council.72
6. Conclusion
In the legal debate on EU agencies, the Meroni doctrine of 1958 is often applied 
to the establishment and functioning of these bodies. In this contribution a 
number of fundamental differences between the Brussels Agencies at issue in 
Meroni and the EU agencies of today were highlighted. It was argued that these 
differences need to be further analysed in order to understand the true implica-
tions of the Meroni ruling for EU agencies. At the same time, attention was 
drawn to a less well-known ruling by the Court, the Romano case of 1981. 
This ruling seems more relevant for the study of EU agencies, but at the same 
time even more restrictive than Meroni as regards the possibility to attribute 
implementing powers to auxiliary bodies. This ruling was further analysed and 
its implications for the EU agencies looked into. Although the Treaty revisions 
70. Why the Administrative Commission was initially established is explained by Maas, cf. 
op. cit. supra note 27.
71. Hofmann, “Seven challenges for EU administrative law”, 2 Review of European Admin-
istrative Law (2009), 46–7.
72. Ibid.
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since 1981 have done away with the first of the two objections raised by the 
Court in Romano, the Court’s second objection, the fact that the Treaty only 
provides for the Commission or the Council to implement policy at EU level, 
is still as pertinent today as it was in 1981. The role granted to the newly estab-
lished agencies in the financial sector in the implementation of EU legislation 
through delegated and implementing acts has therefore been found question-
able in this regard. Thus, although the framers of the Lisbon Treaty have 
updated the Treaty’s system of judicial protection, they have failed to close 
the institutional deficit remarked by Everson and Majone, as the Treaty still 
does not provide for a role by EU agencies in the implementation of EU poli-
cies, leaving the process of agencification of the EU administration on shaky 
legal grounds. 
